Abstract. This paper studies sourcing decisions of firms in a multitier supply chain when procurement is subject to disruption risk. We argue that features of the production process that are commonly encountered in practice (including differential production technologies and financial constraints) may result in the formation of inefficient supply chains, owing to the misalignment of the sourcing incentives of firms at different tiers. We provide a characterization of the conditions under which upstream suppliers adopt sourcing strategies that are suboptimal from the perspective of firms further downstream. Our analysis highlights that a focus on optimizing procurement decisions in each tier of the supply chain in isolation may not be sufficient for mitigating risks at an aggregate level. Rather, we argue that a holistic view of the entire supply network is necessary to properly assess and secure against disruptive events. Importantly, the misalignment we identify does not originate from cost or reliability asymmetries. Rather, firms' sourcing decisions are driven by the interplay of the firms' risk considerations with nonconvexities in the production process. This implies that bilateral contracts that could involve under-delivery penalties may be insufficient to align incentives.
Introduction
Despite their vital role in the production process in any modern economy, supply chain linkages have been increasingly recognized as a source of propagation and amplification of risk. Such a role was highlighted by two recent natural disasters in Asia, the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake (and the subsequent tsunami) in Japan and the severe flooding during the monsoon season in Thailand. As documented by several articles, 1 these events caused severe disruptions in a wide range of industries (most notably in the automotive and electronics industries), raising questions about firms' understanding of the architecture of their supply networks and the extent of their exposure to disruption risks. In addition, these disasters highlighted that many firms' efforts to hedge risk by diversifying their supplier base and forming arborescent production chains were circumvented by the choices of other firms further upstream the chain, resulting in structures that featured significant overlaps. For instance, as observed by Greimel (2012) , Japanese "automakers thought they had hedged risk by diversifying Tier 1 and Tier 2 suppliers . . . [assuming] the supply base is in the form of a tree's roots, spreading out further down the line. But the supply chain was actually more diamond shaped, with rival suppliers turning to the same subsuppliers for parts."
Motivated by these observations, this paper studies the sourcing decisions of firms in a multitiered supply chain in the presence of supplier disruption risk. We argue that features of the production process that are commonly encountered in practice (including differential production technologies and financial constraints) coupled with the presence of disruption risk may result in the formation of inefficient supply chains. In particular, we show that upstream firms may find it optimal to adopt sourcing strategies that are suboptimal from the points of view of firms further downstream. Identifying such potential causes of misalignment provides guidance on possible actions that downstream firms can take to alleviate the resulting inefficiencies.
We present the above insights in the context of a three-tier supply chain model, consisting of a pair of suppliers at the top two tiers and a single downstream manufacturer. Procurement from the top-tier firms is subject to disruption risk. To capture the chain's production process in a general and parsimonious manner, we model the mapping between the total number of units a firm receives from its upstream suppliers (the firm's inputs) and the volume of the intermediate good it produces (the firm's output) by a general, potentially nonlinear, function h.
Our first result establishes that if h is concave or convex everywhere (e.g., because of economies or diseconomies of scale in the production technology, Operations Research, 2018 , vol. 66, no. 4, pp. 1023 -1039 , © 2018 respectively), then the optimal level of supplier diversification from the points of view of the middle-tier firms and the manufacturer coincide. In other words, in the absence of any nonconvexities in the production process, the sourcing preferences of the firms throughout the chain are fully aligned.
Such an alignment of incentives, however, may break down if the production function h exhibits nonconvexities. In fact, our main results show that depending on the shape of h, the optimal sourcing decisions of the suppliers may be suboptimal from the downstream firm's perspective. We provide a characterization of whether and how such incentive misalignments may manifest themselves. In particular, we present conditions under which the manufacturer considers the middle-tier firms' optimal sourcing profiles insufficiently or excessively diversified.
The divergence of preferences over the chain in the presence of nonconvexities is a consequence of the fact that the joint sourcing decisions of the upstream firms not only affect their own profits but also have a first-order impact on the risk profile of the procurement channels available to the downstream firms. More specifically in the context of our model, the correlation between the number of units the manufacturer obtains from the two middle-tier firms depends on the structure of the supply chain further upstream.
The intuition underlying our general results is most transparently understood by focusing on a special case in which the production function h is S-shaped, in the sense that it is convex for small input sizes but is otherwise concave everywhere else (and, hence, on average). As a way of ensuring themselves against disruption risks, middle-tier firms find it optimal to source from all potential upstream suppliers. Multisourcing from the same set of suppliers, however, makes the firms' sourcing profiles less diverse (and, hence, more correlated) . Consequently, the convexity of h for small input values implies that, under multisourcing, a large negative yield shock at either upstream firm may reduce the output of both middle-tier firms simultaneously, hence significantly reducing the total quantity delivered to the manufacturer. The negative impact of such simultaneous disruptions on the manufacturer's bottom line may be large enough to outweigh any gains in reducing the probability of individual failures, making the chain suboptimal from the manufacturer's perspective.
As a way of illustrating the relevance of the effect we study, we present two examples based on realistic features of the supply process that result in nonconvexities in the production functions of upstream suppliers. First, following the recent work on the role of financial distress and bankruptcy in operational decisions (e.g., Yang et al. 2015, Yang and Birge 2017) , we explore how bankruptcy risk may induce suboptimal sourcing decisions from upstream suppliers. Furthermore, we show how the choice between production technologies with different yield ratios and fixed start-up costs may elicit a similar effect.
Importantly, the inefficiencies we identify arise as a result of the interaction of the firms' risk considerations with their nonconvex production functions. In particular and in contrast to most of the prior literature, the suboptimality of the equilibrium supply chain is not driven by asymmetries in the suppliers' characteristics (such as procurement costs, disruption profiles, or information) or by competition effects. Rather, it is the consequence of the fact that the optimal levels of risk diversification from the points of view of firms at different tiers of the supply chain may be significantly different in the presence of nonconvexities. We also remark that even though we illustrate our main insights by incorporating nonconvexities into the production process, the nontrivial interaction between multisourcing and supply chain miscoordination is potentially present in any environment that features nonconvexities and moral hazard.
In summary, our analysis highlights that strategies that focus on optimizing sourcing decisions in each tier in isolation may not be sufficient for mitigating risks at an aggregate level. Rather, a thorough understanding of the entire structure of the supply network is necessary to properly assess and secure against disruptive events. We also discuss a number of actions that firms can undertake to address the misalignment of incentives between the different tiers of the supply chain, including segmenting or regionalizing the chain, standardizing component parts, or offering better financial terms in their bilateral procurement contracts. Furthermore, our results suggest that, in certain scenarios, downstream firms may need to explicitly include the sourcing decisions of their suppliers as part of the terms of their contracts or resort to (potentially more expensive) sourcing strategies, such as direct sourcing. This adds yet another dimension to the question of whether a firm should delegate or control its procurement process. Even in the absence of any information asymmetries, downstream firms may find it optimal to control their procurement process when the costs from potential disruptions are high.
Related Literature
Several recent papers study the management of disruptions in supply chains via multisourcing, mostly focusing on models that involve a two-tier setting. For example, Tomlin (2006) focuses on a model in which a firm employs two suppliers of different reliabilities and explores the effectiveness of various disruption management strategies (such as carrying excess inventory, sourcing from the more reliable supplier, or passive acceptance). Relatedly, Dada et al. (2007) explore the procurement problem of a newsvendor with unreliable suppliers and find that supplier unreliability reduces the service level experienced by the customers. Hopp and Yin (2006) consider arborescent supply chain networks and suggest guidelines on how to protect them against catastrophic failures. Their analysis suggests that an optimal policy makes use of safety stock inventory or backup capacity in at most one node in each path to the end customer. More recently, Qi et al. (2010) consider an integrated supply chain design problem in which the goal is to determine where to place retailers so that the cost of meeting customer demand while protecting against supplier disruptions is minimized. Furthermore, Federgruen and Yang (2009) study the question of optimal supply diversification when firms differ from one another in terms of their yield distributions, procurement costs, and capacity levels, whereas DeCroix (2013) considers an assembly system when component suppliers may be subject to disruption risk and provides efficient heuristic policies to compute the optimal order quantities.
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Unlike these papers, which mainly study riskmitigation strategies from the point of view of a single firm, our objective is to examine the sourcing incentives of firms that belong to different tiers of a supply chain and identify general conditions under which the endogenously formed structures are (sub)optimal for the firms further downstream.
Also related is the recent work of Ang et al. (2017) , who study optimal sourcing and disruption risk in multitier supply chains. As in Tomlin (2006) , they focus on an environment with asymmetric supplier cost structures and reliabilities and provide a comparison of the performance of different supply chain structures. In contrast to these works, the divergence in the firms' sourcing incentives in our paper is not driven by supplier asymmetries. Rather, we identify a novel effect that arises as a result of the interplay between the firm's risk considerations and the nonconvexities in the production process, an effect that is present even in the absence of asymmetries. As we further elaborate in Section 5, this has implications with regards to how a firm can induce optimal sourcing decisions: when the misalignment originates from cost/reliability asymmetries at upstream tiers, simple underdelivery penalties may be sufficient to induce an optimal chain as they can be used to offset the advantage that an upstream supplier has over the rest. By contrast, we argue that bilateral contracts are inherently insufficient to deal with the types of misalignments we identify.
Our paper is also related to Babich et al. (2007) and Tang and Kouvelis (2011) , who study competition in the presence of exogenously correlated disruption risks. Their results establish that in the presence of competition, a firm may be willing to forgo the benefits of dualsourcing to differentiate itself from its competitor and benefit in the event of a favorable realization of uncertainty. In contrast to these works, we analyze how the incentives of firms at higher tiers would endogenously determine not only the structure of the supply chain but also the extent of supplier risk correlation faced by downstream firms.
In addition to the above-mentioned papers, a different strand of literature, including DeCroix (2004, 2006) , studies decentralized and modular assembly systems in which final products are assembled from modules produced by higher-level tiers in the presence of demand uncertainty. Belavina (2017) , on the other hand, study the effect of the supply network configuration on the efficacy of relational sourcing in ensuring socially responsible behavior.
Our paper also contributes to the smaller literature that focuses on the interplay between the structure of the supply chain and its performance. Corbett and Karmarkar (2001) focus on entry decisions and postentry competition in multitier serial supply chains. They study how the cost structures of firms in different tiers determine the number of entrants and the level of competition and, as a result, affect prices and quantities in each tier. Majumder and Srinivasan (2008) focus on contracting in large, acyclic supply chains and show that contract leadership affects the performance of the entire supply chain. More recently, Acemoglu et al. (2012 Acemoglu et al. ( , 2017 ) study whether and how supply chain linkages can function as a mechanism for propagation and amplification of disruptions in general supply networks while assuming that all firms are competitive.
Also related is the recent work of Federgruen and Hu (2016) , which studies sequential multimarket price competition in general supply networks. They show the existence and equivalence (in the sense of firms' profits) of equilibria under linear price-only contracts while abstracting away from yield or other types of uncertainty. We, on the other hand, mainly focus on the propagation of yield shocks in the chain and study the implications of multisourcing strategies of the firms.
The paper is also related to the works of Stiglitz (2010a, b) who studies the implications of financial market integration and argues that liberalization of capital markets may be undesirable from a social welfare perspective. Finally, our work is related to a recent series of papers in the finance literature, such as Ibragimov et al. (2011 ), Wagner (2011 , and Bimpikis and Tahbaz-Salehi (2014) , which explore the trade-off between diversification and diversity of portfolios of financial institutions. The present work focuses on an entirely different context, sourcing in a multitier supply chain when procurement is subject to disruption risk, and provides a comprehensive characterization of when inefficiencies may arise as a function of the underlying production process.
Operations Research, 2018 , vol. 66, no. 4, pp. 1023 -1039 , © 2018 To summarize, our framework is among the very few recent papers that go beyond the standard twotier supply chain and explore the implications of disruption risk in the formation of multitier chains. More important, and in contrast to most of the prior work that focuses on asymmetries between firms as the main source of any inefficiencies, we identify a novel effect that originates from the interplay between the firms' risk considerations and nonconvexities in the production process: mitigating risk at an individual level may actually lead to a higher aggregate risk for the firms further downstream. Although simple amendments to bilateral contracts may be effective in restoring the distortions resulting from supplier asymmetries (e.g., underdelivery penalties), they fail to induce optimal supply chain structures in the presence of nonconvexities.
Model
Consider a three-tier supply network, depicted in Figure 1 , consisting of a single manufacturer, two identical tier 1 component suppliers (denoted by A and B and referred to as suppliers for short), and a pair of tier 2 part fabricators (denoted by 1 and 2 and referred to as fabricators).
The Manufacturer. The manufacturer has access to a technology that can transform each unit of an intermediate component (sourced from the component suppliers) into a unit of a final good that is subsequently sold to a downstream market. It purchases the required components at a unit price of p, which we assume to be fixed and exogenously given. Note that the supply chain illustrated in Figure 1 does not describe an assembly operation but rather the manufacturer's sourcing of one key component. In the presence of disruption risks, the manufacturer may find it optimal to source this component from multiple suppliers (as opposed to the potentially simpler option of solesourcing) to guarantee a sufficient number of units for its own customers.
The manufacturer's revenue depends on the total number of units delivered by its two suppliers. Specifically, conditional on the delivery of y units of the intermediate good, it obtains a revenue equal to (y), where is a (weakly) increasing function. The manufacturer's net profit is thus given by (y) ⇤ (y) p y. Given its general form, function is essentially a reduced-form mapping that can capture different features of the manufacturer's technology (e.g., its production cost or efficiency) or those of the downstream market (e.g., the price elasticity of demand). For example, if demand for the final good is deterministic, inelastic, and equal to D and the manufacturer incurs quadratic production costs to convert the suppliers' output to the final good, then
where p f denotes the price in the downstream market. If, on the other hand, demand in the downstream market is linear, in which case the final good's price as a function of the quantity sold is given by p f (y) ⇤ ↵ f f y for some constants ↵ f , f > 0, and the manufacturer's production costs are negligible, then the revenue function takes the following form: (y) ⇤ (↵ f f y)y. Throughout the paper, we restrict attention to the revenue function being concave. Apart from being an assumption that is widely adopted in the literature (both examples above involve concave revenue functions), we view this as being practically relevant since the marginal revenue from selling an additional unit to the market is arguably often decreasing in the total volume of sales.
The Suppliers. Tier 1 suppliers produce the intermediate components by transforming parts received from the fabricators at tier 2. Each supplier contracts with the tier 2 firms to deliver up to a prespecified number of units at a given price q. The key decision made by each supplier is how to allocate its order between the two fabricators. More specifically, supplier j 2 {A, B} chooses the fraction j 2 [0, 1] of its total order that it places with fabricator 1. Thus, the case in which j 2 {0, 1} corresponds to the supplier single-sourcing, whereas at the other extreme, j ⇤ 1/2 corresponds to the case in which it divides its orders equally between the two fabricators.
We denote the suppliers' common production function by a general increasing function h, which represents the technology that transforms input parts into components delivered to the manufacturer. Thus, conditional on receiving x units from the fabricators, the net profit of a supplier is equal to ⇡(x) ⇤ ph(x) qx.
Even though we refer to h as a production function, it does not have to be interpreted as being tied to a physical production process. Rather, similar to the manufacturer's revenue function , function h simply represents a reduced-form mapping from the number of parts available to the supplier to the number of components it sells to the manufacturer. Thus, for instance, it may capture yield loss resulting from quality issues, or, as we show in Section 4, it may represent other forms of technological, financial, or operational constraints.
The Fabricators. At the top of the supply chain, the part fabricators are responsible for producing parts to be used by the component suppliers. The key underlying assumption in our model is that the interaction between the fabricators and the suppliers is subject to disruption risk in terms of the quantity delivered (e.g., as a result of production yield uncertainty at the fabricator).
Formally, we let the random variable z i 2 [0, 1] capture the fraction of the total order quantity delivered by fabricator i 2 {1, 2}, which is proportionally allocated to the two suppliers. Thus, the total number of parts delivered to supplier j is equal to x j ⇤ j z 1 + (1 j )z 2 , where j captures j's sourcing decision. Throughout the paper, we assume that z 1 and z 2 are independently distributed with a common probability density function f that has support over the unit interval.
As a final remark, we emphasize that we have deliberately restricted our attention to a fully symmetric environment, in terms of both the suppliers' production functions and the fabricators' (un)reliability. This assumption is made to ensure that our results are driven by the interplay between the firms' production functions and risk mitigation considerations, as opposed to any form of asymmetries between different firms. Clearly, the presence of such asymmetries may induce additional distortions in the firms' sourcing incentives.
Supply Chain Miscoordination
In this section, we study how the sourcing decisions of the suppliers affect the profits of the manufacturer and the performance of the supply chain. In particular, we show that depending on the shape of functions and h, the sourcing preferences of the suppliers may not align with those of the manufacturer. To exhibit the potential wedge in the firms' preferred sourcing strategies in the most transparent manner, we restrict the suppliers to choose between either sourcing from a single tier 2 firm or dividing their orders equally between the two fabricators, an outcome to which we simply refer as dual-sourcing. Furthermore, for the results we state in Section 3, we abstract away from the possibility of overordering in the chain as summarized in Assumption 1. Assumption 1. We assume that neither the downstream manufacturer nor the tier suppliers overorder-that is, the manufacturer's total order quantity from tier is equal to its optimal order quantity in the absence of disruption risk.
For example, for a differentiable revenue function , the manufacturer's total order quantity y is such that 0 (y) ⇤ p (i.e., equal to the optimal order quantity in the absence of risk). Moreover, for expositional simplicity, we normalize the manufacturer's total order quantity y to 2, which is split equally between the two tier 1 suppliers.
Assumption 1 allows for tractable analysis in this quite general framework in which we do not impose any assumptions on the suppliers' production function h or the fabricators' yield distribution (as captured by f ). We relax this assumption both in the context of the examples in Section 4 (that impose some structure on h) and in a setting we study in the electronic companion (that imposes realistic assumptions on the yield distribution) and show that our findings remain robust.
We start by deriving conditions on function h under which both tier 1 suppliers prefer to dual-source. Let ⇧ s and ⇧ d denote the expected profits of a component supplier under single-sourcing and dual-sourcing, respectively. It is immediate that the expected profit of the firm under single-sourcing is equal to
whereas if the supplier sources equally from both fabricators, its expected profit is
Comparing the two expressions above implies that tier 1 suppliers strictly prefer dual-sourcing to singlesourcing if and only if
where
Thus, inequality (1) provides a necessary and sufficient condition under which tier 1 suppliers dual-source in equilibrium. Given the definition of zz 0 , it is immediate that the curvature of h plays a central role in the optimal level of diversification from the points of view of the suppliers. For instance, the suppliers strictly prefer to source from both fabricators as long as h is strictly concave, whereas they are indifferent between singleand dual-sourcing when h is linear. We next determine the conditions under which the manufacturer obtains a higher profit if the suppliers dual-source. Let s and d denote the expected profits of the manufacturer when both tier 1 suppliers employ single-sourcing and dual-sourcing strategies, respectively. 3 We have
where recall that (y) ⇤ (y) p y. Therefore, the manufacturer would strictly prefer the tier 1 suppliers to dual-source if and only if
As in the case of the suppliers, the above inequality captures the fact that the optimal level of diversification from the point of view of the manufacturer depends on the shapes of functions h and . More importantly, however, comparing inequality (2) with (1) enables us to determine whether the sourcing incentives of the firms at different tiers of the supply chain coincide with one another. In particular, it implies that if z 1 z 2 has the same sign for all pairs z 1 , z 2 , then inequality (2) is satisfied if and only if (1) holds regardless of the shape of , leading to the following result.
Proposition 1. If the production function h is concave, then the suppliers and the manufacturer are better off when tier firms dual-source. On the other hand, if h is convex, then all parties find it optimal for the suppliers to single-source.
In other words, there is no wedge between the firms' optimal degree of diversification as long as the production function is concave or convex everywhere. Such an alignment of sourcing incentives, however, may not necessarily hold when function h does not satisfy the conditions of Proposition 1. In fact, as our next result illustrates, the optimal supply chain structure from the manufacturer's perspective may not coincide with the one that the suppliers prefer.
Proposition 2. Suppose that the following conditions are satisfied (a)
The production function h is strictly concave on average that is,
(b) There existsx > 0 such that h is strictly convex for all values belowx that is,
Then, there exists a concave revenue function such that tier suppliers find it optimal to dual-source, whereas the manufacturer would be better off if they employ a singlesourcing strategy. Thus, even though the suppliers find it optimal to source equally from each fabricator, the manufacturer prefers a less diversified sourcing strategy at the higher tiers. The intuition underlying Proposition 2 can be understood by comparing the costs and benefits of dual-sourcing by the tier 1 suppliers from the point of view of the manufacturer. When the suppliers diversify their own sources of input (i.e., when ⇤ 1/2), the likelihood that each single supplier faces a shortage is reduced. This is clearly beneficial not only from the point of view of the suppliers themselves but also from that of the manufacturer: such a diversified strategy would also increase the expected number of units delivered to the manufacturer from each supplier.
The manufacturer, however, also bears an implicit cost when tier 1 firms decide to dual-source. Given the concavity of the revenue function , the manufacturer's expected profit is not additively separable in the number of units it obtains from its two suppliers. Hence, it is critical for the manufacturer to obtain enough components from at least one supplier. Yet, when tier 1 firms choose A ⇤ B ⇤ 1/2, the likelihood that their outputs are low simultaneously increases because of the overlap in their procurement channels. Specifically, under dualsourcing, a large disruption at either of the fabricators may reduce the output of both suppliers significantly. By contrast, had a supplier used a single-sourcing strategy, it would have only been exposed to the risk of a severe disruption at the sole fabricator from which it sources.
The assumptions underlying Proposition 2 have straightforward interpretations. Condition (a), which is the same as inequality (1), essentially implies that the production function h exhibits enough concavity on average. This assumption guarantees that tier 1 suppliers find it optimal to dual-source, as such a sourcing strategy reduces the disruption risk they face. In other words, assumption (a) captures the standard benefit of risk diversification for the suppliers. Condition (b), on the other hand, states that even though dual-sourcing reduces risk, on average, that is not the case if the fabricators face severe shocks. In other words, under dualsourcing, the realization of a small enough z would lead to severe drops in the output of both suppliers. This assumption plays a significant role in creating the wedge between the incentives of firms at different tiers. Note that, as already shown in Proposition 1, if z 1 z 2 < 0 for all z 1 , z 2 , then the sourcing preferences of the suppliers would be fully aligned with those of the downstream manufacturer.
The concavity of the revenue function guarantees that the manufacturer finds simultaneous severe disruptions at both suppliers costly. More specifically, even though dual-sourcing reduces the risk faced by the suppliers, the resulting benefit for the manufacturer does not justify the cost associated with the risk of simultaneous severe disruptions at both channels. Note that if is linear, then the preferred structure of the supply chain from the point of view of the manufacturer would coincide with that of the suppliers, regardless of the form of the production function h.
To summarize, Proposition 2 illustrates that depending on the shape of function h, tier 1 suppliers (when they have access to the same tier 2 fabricators) may choose a sourcing strategy that is too diversified from the point of view of the manufacturer and thus result in overlapping procurement channels as opposed to an arborescent supply chain. 4 As we show in Section 3.1, the conditions of the proposition are satisfied by a wide array of production functions. This, however, is not the only way that misalignments of incentives across the chain may manifest themselves. Rather, as our next result illustrates, under a different set of conditions, the manufacturer may prefer the suppliers to dual-source, even though the suppliers find it optimal to source from a single fabricator.
Proposition 3. Suppose that the following conditions are satisfied (a)
The production function h is strictly convex on average that is,
(b) There existsx > 0 such that h is strictly concave for all values belowx that is,
Then, there exists a convex revenue function such that tier suppliers find it optimal to single-source, whereas the manufacturer would be better off if they employ a dualsourcing strategy.
The intuition for the above result is similar to that of Proposition 2. In particular, the assumption that the production is convex on average guarantees that the suppliers find it optimal to rely on a single fabricator. However, the concavity of h for small values of z, alongside the assumption that the revenue function is also concave, implies that the manufacturer would benefit from risk diversification at higher tiers.
Nonconvexities and Miscoordination
The juxtaposition of Propositions 1-3 highlights that not only the presence of nonconvexities in the supply chain can create a wedge between the incentives of firms at different tiers but also the exact nature of such nonconvexities plays a first-order role in determining the type of misalignments that may arise.
To further clarify how the shape of the production function affects the optimal structure of the supply chain from the points of view of firms at different tiers, it is instructive to focus on specific functional forms. In particular, we assume that the yield shocks are uniformly distributed over the unit interval and focus on production functions that are symmetric around their unique inflection point x ⇤ 2 (0, 1).
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Figure 2 depicts one such function: it is strictly convex for x < x ⇤ and has a negative curvature if
Such an S-shaped h may, for example, represent a production technology where quality/yield improves with scale, but these benefits are overcome by diminishing returns associated with management complexity at large volumes (e.g., Williamson 1967, McAfee and McMillan 1995) . Given the symmetry of such a convex-concave production function around its inflection point, a value of x ⇤ < 1/2 means that h(x) is concave, on average, even though it is strictly convex at small input sizes. Hence, such a function satisfies the conditions of Proposition 2, leading to the following result.
Corollary 1. Suppose that h is convex-concave with inflection point x
⇤ 2 (0, 1). There exists a concave function such that Part (i) states that when the concave segment of the production function is larger, the effect of dualsourcing for tier 1 suppliers is unambiguously positive. However, the convexity of h for small values of x implies that, under dual-sourcing, the manufacturer's loss from an increase in the likelihood of simultaneous disruptions on its procurement channels outweigh the benefits of diversification. In other words, the supply chain would exhibit excessive diversification from the point of view of the manufacturer. Part (ii) then shows that, for such a convex-concave function h, this is the only type of misalignment that can arise. Note that similar arguments can characterize the nature of preference misalignment when the curvature of the production function changes sign from negative to positive at x ⇤ (akin to Proposition 3). Table 1 summarizes our findings in terms of the shapes of h and . In particular, it states whether and how these functions' curvature properties can create a wedge between the optimal levels of diversification from the points of view of firms at different tiers of the supply chain.
We end this discussion by arguing that even though our results were presented in the context of a three-tier supply chain consisting of a pair of firms at the top two tiers, the model's underlying insights remain valid if each tier consists of multiple firms. As long as firms in each tier need to rely on a common set of potential upstream firms, the presence of nonconvexities can lead to misalignments between their desired sourcing decisions and those of their downstream customers.
Examples
In this section, we present two examples to illustrate how different features of the procurement process may result in nonconvexities and subsequently lead to a misalignment of diversification preferences between the suppliers and the manufacturer. The first example examines sourcing in the presence of bankruptcy risk whereas the second considers the choice between production technologies with different yields and start-up costs.
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Each of the examples extends beyond the model analyzed in Section 3 to demonstrate that the insights developed are more broadly applicable.
Sourcing in the Presence of Bankruptcy Risk
Consider the model presented in Section 2, and suppose that the suppliers can transform each unit of the input sourced from the fabricators to a unit of the intermediate good. However, to initiate production, each supplier has to pay a fixed cost of v. If it is unable to cover v, the firm has to cease production. On the other hand, once the supplier pays v, it remains in business and obtains a continuation value equal to R. This value-which is obtained in addition to any revenue the firm obtains from selling the output to the manufacturer-captures the value of staying in business or that of the firm's other operations. Thus, even though tier 1 suppliers can transform their inputs to the intermediate good one-for-one, their effective production function is given by
where x d ⇤ v/(p q) is the minimum number of parts required from the fabricators to allow for production. Figure 3 depicts this function.
Given the shape of the above production function, one can show the following result (even when the manufacturer may over-order-i.e., when Assumption 1 is relaxed). The intuition underlying the above proposition is similar to our earlier results (and specifically Proposition 2): by dual-sourcing, each supplier can reduce the likelihood of bankruptcy, an event that it finds very costly. A side effect of such a strategy, however, is that the two suppliers' procurement channels exhibit more overlap, and their outputs become more correlated; hence, the likelihood of the event that they cease production simultaneously increases. This means that the manufacturer would have obtained higher expected profits had the suppliers chosen , 1/2.
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One would expect the inefficiency identified above to be a first-order concern in industries where production involves sizable fixed costs and/or firms operate with high leverage or under high levels of financial uncertainty. In such environments, downstream firms could follow a number of steps to alleviate the adverse effects associated with their suppliers' sourcing decisions. First, it is straightforward to see that the benefit upstream firms derive from diversifying their sourcing strategy (and thus forming an inefficient supply chain on aggregate) is decreasing with x d . In turn, this suggests that actions that aim at reducing x d weaken the suppliers' incentives to follow a dual sourcing strategy (which is potentially harder to manage and monitor). Concretely, the manufacturer can directly subsidize the suppliers' fixed costs or renegotiate the terms of their contractual arrangements to offer higher margins (at least for low quantity levels) and, thus, indirectly incentivize its suppliers to follow sourcing strategies that are optimal from its point of view.
As an alternative to (directly or indirectly) subsidizing the suppliers' fixed operating costs to reduce their risk of bankruptcy, the manufacturer can formally or informally commit to offer financial assistance to the suppliers in the event of a looming bankruptcy in the form of a low-interest loan or bailout funds. The consequence of such a commitment would be to reduce the supplier's insurance motive in applying a dual-sourcing strategy and, thus, result in a supply chain structure that is preferred by the manufacturer.
The discussion above may help explain GM's recent (and quite uncharacteristic) strategy reversal: according to reports in the Wall Street Journal (Bennett 2016) , GM pledged to give the opportunity to a subset of its parts makers that operate under rising material costs and unstable financial environments to renegotiate their contract terms periodically to "avoid production disruptions by ensuring suppliers don't succumb to financial strain."
Production Technology Choice
In this example, we assume that each supplier has access to two distinct production technologies, which we call manual and automated. The manual production is less efficient than the automated production in the sense that it has a lower yield, for instance, because of quality losses. Formally, we assume that µ m < µ a , where µ t is the production yield for technology t 2 {a, m}. A prototypical example of the yield impact of technology decisions is in semiconductor manufacturing, where yield is highly sensitive to contamination risks (and automation can significantly improve yields). Despite the fact that the automated technology is more efficient than the manual technology, it requires a fixed setup cost of v a . To focus on the nonconvexities introduced by technology choice, we assume that both technologies have identical marginal costs of production c that we normalize to zero. We also assume that the automated technology is capacity constrained with capacity denoted by w a . Finally, we assume that pµ m > q, which guarantees that production is always justified, even if the suppliers only employ the manual production technology.
First, we characterize the production level of each component supplier as a function of the aggregate quantity it receives from the fabricators. Let x denote the total number of units that is delivered to a supplier. Given the setup cost of the automated technology, there exists a quantity x m such that for x 6 x m , the supplier would only employ manual production. Indeed,
.
On the other hand, given the higher yield of the automated production technology, the supplier finds it optimal to utilize it as soon as paying its fixed setup cost v a is justified. In particular, for any x 2 (x m , x a ], the supplier would only use the automated technology, where x a ⇤ w a /µ a is the number of inputs that would make the capacity constraint of the automated technology bind. Finally, beyond this point, the supplier utilizes both production technologies side by side. Note that in view of the fact that pµ m > q, the supplier employs all available inputs to meet the manufacturer's order. Hence, to summarize, the optimal production function of a supplier that has access to the two technologies discussed above is given by
To simplify the analysis and exposition, we normalize the manufacturer's optimal order to each supplier in the absence of disruption risk to be equal to 1; that is, µ m (1 x a ) + µ a x a ⇤ 1 (this is without loss of generality, since we allow the manufacturer to order more than one to mitigate the supply uncertainty). Furthermore, we assume that x a 6 1/2. Note that, as depicted in Figure 4 , the production function h(x) is linear for x < x m , whereas it is concave for x > x m . As discussed in Section 3, this nonconvexity of the production function plays a crucial role in our results.
As in the general model, we assume that the disruption risk in the supply chain is represented by independent and identical distributions on the fraction of the total order quantities delivered by the fabricators z 1 and z 2 , respectively. More specifically, we assume that z 1 and z 2 are uniformly distributed over [0, 1] . Recall that each supplier receives a payment of p for any unit delivered to the manufacturer. Hence, if a supplier sources fractions and 1 of its inputs from fabricators 1 and 2, respectively, its expected profit is equal to
where n is the total number of units ordered by the supplier. We allow the manufacturer to overorder in anticipation of potential disruptions (i.e., set n > 1), but we assume that the suppliers do not overorder. Although the latter assumption is necessary for analytical tractability (as we already allow the manufacturer to overorder), it is plausible when the margins for upstream firms are small, and thus, overordering is relatively expensive for them. Then, the first term on the right-hand side of (5) is simply the expected cost of production whereas the second term captures the expected setup cost of the automated technology. Finally, the last term represents the expected revenue of the supplier. As Equation (5) shows, the fact that the fabricators are subject to disruptions means that the expected profit of each supplier depends on its sourcing strategy. In particular, suppliers choose 2 [0, 1] to maximize ⇧. We have the following result.
Proposition 5. The suppliers prefer to dual-source regardless of the total order size and the fixed setup cost that is,
⇧(n, 1/2) > ⇧(n, ) for all n and all 2 [0, 1].
Thus, both suppliers find it optimal to source equally from the two fabricators. This is simply again a consequence of the standard benefits of diversification: dualsourcing reduces the aggregate risk that each supplier is exposed to. More specifically, it maximizes the likelihood that the supplier obtains enough inputs from the fabricators to employ the more productive automated technology. However, this does not necessarily imply that dual-sourcing by the suppliers is optimal from the point of view of the manufacturer. In fact, as our next result shows, the incentives of the manufacturer and the suppliers are not always fully aligned.
The manufacturer's expected profit as a function of the suppliers' sourcing decisions is equal to
6) where A and B are the sourcing decisions of the tier 1 firms, and the expectation is with respect to the supply shocks z 1 and z 2 . We have the following result. 
The two parts of Proposition 6 that are directly analogous to Propositions 1 and 2 illustrate the insights we developed in Section 3: in the absence of nonconvexities in the suppliers' production functions (i.e., when v a ⇤ 0; see Figure 4 (a)), the sourcing incentives of firms at different tiers are fully aligned. On the other hand, this no longer holds in the presence of nonconvexities (as in Figure 4(b) ), and as a result, the optimal supply network structure from the points of view of the suppliers does not coincide with that of the manufacturer. Again, as is the case for the model of Section 2, even though the likelihood of underdelivery by each supplier is reduced, dual-sourcing implies that each supplier underdelivers at the same states of the world at which the other one cannot meet its obligations. The resulting increase in the likelihood of such simultaneous "failures" reduces the profits of the manufacturer to the extent that it may outweigh the benefits of dualsourcing. It is the presence of this implicit cost that lies behind the discrepancy between the incentives of firms at different tiers: even though the manufacturer finds the simultaneous underdelivery by both suppliers very costly, the suppliers do not fully internalize the effect of their sourcing decisions.
As in the previous example, it is straightforward to see that the suppliers' incentive to choose a dualsourcing strategy that is suboptimal from the point of view of the manufacturer weakens as the fixed setup cost v a of the automated technology decreases. In addition, manufacturers could directly invest in their suppliers' research and development efforts to increase the productivity of their technologies (captured in the context of this example by µ a ) or decrease their setup costs. Such investments could not only result in short-term cost savings (because of a productivity increase) but also incentivize suppliers to follow the manufacturer's preferred sourcing strategy.
The Role of Contracts
Our results in the previous sections establish that the presence of nonconvexities in the production process can result in misaligned preferences at different tiers, thus leading to the formation of suboptimal supply chains from the point of view of the manufacturer. In this section, we discuss the role that contracts play in our results.
In particular, in addition to the presence of nonconvexities in the production function h, the emergence of a wedge between the sourcing preferences of different firms in our model relies on two key assumptions on the types of contracts that firms can write with one another.
First, note that the interaction between the manufacturer and its suppliers in our model is subject to a form of moral hazard: even though the sourcing decisions of the suppliers have a first-order bearing on the manufacturer's profits, these decisions are assumed to be noncontractable. Such moral hazard problems would arise if, for example, the upper echelons of the chain are not fully observable to the downstream firm. If the downstream firm can observe, verify, and contract on the sourcing decisions of its suppliers (i.e., A and B ), it can induce them to adopt manufactureroptimal sourcing decisions via -contingent contracts.
The mere presence of moral hazard, however, does not necessarily imply that the resulting supply chain structure is suboptimal from the manufacturer's perspective. Note that even though the manufacturer might not be able to extract all the surplus from the suppliers, in general-and in the presence of complete contracts-it may still be able to induce the right sourcing decisions by providing them with enough rents. However, the key observation is that the optimal profitmaximizing contract may require cross-contingencies, in the sense that the per-unit price paid to supplier i should depend not only on the number of units delivered by that supplier but also on the number of units delivered by supplier j , i. In other words, simply employing bilateral, nonlinear (no matter how complex) contracts may not induce the right sourcing decisions by the suppliers at minimal cost. To see this, note that in the absence of cross-contingent contracts, the manufacturer needs to make deductions about the sourcing decisions of supplier i based solely on the value of x i , the number of units delivered by that supplier. However, given that the suppliers source from a common set of fabricators, the correlation between x A and x B provides the manufacturer with valuable information about the underlying sourcing decisions A and B . Including this information in the contracts enables the manufacturer to align the suppliers' incentives with its own at a potentially lower cost (however, the resulting contracts may be very difficult to implement or enforce). Thus, it is the presence of moral hazard coupled with the incompleteness of contracts that leads to the divergence of incentives between firms at different tiers.
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More generally, this observation illustrates the potential insufficiency of bilateral contracts for mitigating risks throughout the chain. In particular, contracts whose terms are contingent only on individual outputs may be insufficient for dealing effectively with supply risk at higher tiers. Contrast this with the case when suboptimal supply chains originate from asymmetries in the suppliers' cost or reliability profiles. Then, bilateral penalty functions allow for supply chain coordination (see also Ang et al. 2017 ). This further implies that the presence of nonconvexities in the production Operations Research, 2018 , vol. 66, no. 4, pp. 1023 -1039 , © 2018 process may necessitate the use of different and potentially more complex and expensive sourcing strategies as it is typically challenging to monitor and enforce cross-contingent contracts. Our results thus provide a rationale other than information asymmetries (see Kayış et al. 2013 ) for why direct sourcing may be more attractive when the risk and/or costs associated with disruptive events is high.
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Concluding Remarks
This paper argues that in the presence of nonconvexities, the sourcing preferences of firms at different tiers of a supply chain may not fully coincide, leading to the formation of inefficient chains. Our results highlight that strategies focusing on optimizing sourcing decisions in each tier in isolation may not be sufficient for mitigating risks at an aggregate level. As we argue below, properly assessing and securing against disruptive events affecting a firm's production process necessitates a concerted effort at collecting detailed information about the entire structure of the supply network, developing risk metrics that account for network propagation effects, and providing an appropriate set of incentives for the sourcing decisions of other firms further upstream.
Mapping the Supply Chain Network. As already argued, our results emphasize that the sourcing decisions of a firm's suppliers at various tiers can have first-order implications for the firm's exposure to disruption risk. As such, the first step in any effort to address such misalignment of incentives is to map out the supply chain's detailed network structure. This view is consistent with the practice followed by various large manufacturers over the past few years of building detailed databases on their suppliers (including relatively small upstream companies) and gathering information on the types of products they manufacture, the locations of their plants, and how they source their inputs (Simchi-Levi et al. 2014 , Choi et al. 2015 , Kubota 2016 . Such efforts can also assist with identifying alternatives for further diversifying disruption risks throughout the chain.
Measuring Risk Exposure.
Recently, efforts to improve supply chain resilience have generated new metrics to quantify risk exposure by taking into account the entire structure of a firm's supply network. For example, Simchi-Levi et al. (2014 develop a risk-exposure model that aims to assess the overall impact of a supplier's disruption on the chain. Our findings illustrate that, in addition to accounting for the supply network interactions and the market structure, accounting for the firms' operational environment (as captured by their production functions) can result in risk-exposure metrics that provide a more comprehensive picture of the risks to which firms are exposed.
Forming More Resilient Chains. Many efforts, such as those summarized above, are aimed at identifying and potentially quantifying sources of risk in a firm's existing supply network. Mitigating a firm's risk exposure, however, may require a series of steps at the strategic level to ensure the formation of more resilient chains. Note that our findings illustrate that supply chains that form as the result of firms' individual sourcing decisions may exhibit too much overlap from the point of view of the downstream manufacturer. Our results thus provide an alternative rationale for resorting to segmentation and regionalization strategies. Chopra and Sodhi (2014) argue that adoption of such strategies can be effective in reducing supply chain fragility by containing the adverse effects of a disruptive event to a small subset of product lines or geographic regions. Our model suggests that, in addition to the benefits identified by Chopra and Sodhi (2014) , adoption of segmentation and regionalization strategies may also eliminate the possibility of the formation of overly diversified supply chains to begin with. More concretely in the context of our model, such strategies would ensure that tier 1 suppliers have access to different sets of tier 2 fabricators (e.g., because they source from different regions), thus ruling out the case identified in Proposition 2.
In addition, large manufacturers have begun to standardize parts used in multiple product lines in order to enable shifting production among their suppliers in the event of an emergency (Kubota 2016, Sáenz and Revilla 2014) . For example, Sáenz and Revilla (2014) document the initiatives that Cisco undertook to reconfigure its supply chain by adding flexible manufacturers capable of producing a large set of Cisco's products at short notice. Interpreted in the context of our model and results, note that one of the main drivers of the inefficiency we identify is the fact that disruptive events in tier 2 affect the entirety of the suppliers in tier 1 (due to the overlap in their procurement channels that results from equilibrium decision making). However, if parts were standardized and moving production from one supplier to another could be done smoothly and on short notice, then transshipping a tier 1 supplier's (insufficient) input to another tier 1 supplier would mitigate the adverse effects of this inefficiency.
Aligning Incentives via Better Contracts. In addition to the efforts summarized above, downstream manufacturers are increasingly realizing the need for providing better contract terms to their suppliers to decrease the likelihood of production disruptions (see also a related discussion in Section 4). For example, in a somewhat unusual move, General Motors pledged to offer to a subset of its suppliers-especially those operating in regions of high economic uncertainty-the opportunity to renegotiate their contract terms periodically in order to reduce their risk of failure and bankruptcy (Bennett 2016 , SC Digest Editorial Staff 2016 .
Furthermore, Section 5 argues that firms could sustain coordination (at least to some extent) in their supply chains by leveraging cross-contingent contracts. Although enforcing and monitoring such contracts could be prohibitively costly, spot market trading is a potential alternative (as the resulting price depends on the aggregate supply of the good and is not bilaterally determined) that is practically implementable and widely adopted in some industries (e.g., semiconductors). Thus, our findings provide another explanation for the proliferation of such markets in addition to asymmetric information among market participants (e.g., Mendelson and Tunca 2007) .
Finally, aside from efforts to contain the impact of disruptive events (e.g., by regionalizing the supply chain or enabling quick shifting of production among a firm's suppliers) or providing better financial terms to reduce the likelihood of supplier failure, firms are increasingly engaging in close collaborations with their supply chain partners, and in some cases, they directly manage relationships with subsets of their upstream suppliers. For example, as Choi and Linton (2011) argue, Honda and Toyota directly negotiate contracts with select upstream vendors and explicitly request that their direct suppliers use those vendors exclusively and execute the negotiated terms (thus effectively implementing some form of direct sourcing).
To conclude, we emphasize that, to illustrate the role of nonconvexities in a parsimonious fashion, our model abstracted away from other potentially relevant issues, such as competition, supplier asymmetries, more intricate contracts, etc. Although incorporating such important features into a unified model would result in a more comprehensive framework for examining the formation of multitier supply chains and is a natural next step for future research, we chose to focus on the interplay between nonconvexities and the firms' risk considerations as the only source of any misalignment between their sourcing preferences. This enables us to unambiguously attribute the formation of suboptimal chains to how firms at different tiers in the supply chain decide to deal with the disruption risk they face.
Proof of Proposition 1
If the production function h is concave, then zz 0 < 0 for all z, z 0 2 [0, 1]. It is thus immediate that inequality (1) is satisfied, implying that the suppliers choose a dual-sourcing strategy. On the other hand, in light of Assumption 1, we have for all z, z 0 2 [0, 1],
thus guaranteeing that inequality (2) is also satisfied. That is, the manufacturer's net profit is higher when the suppliers dual-source, proving that the incentives of all parties are fully aligned. The proof for the case that h is convex is similar and is hence omitted. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2
Recall that
Assumption (a) immediately implies that tier 1 suppliers strictly prefer to dual-source. It is thus sufficient to show that the profits of the manufacturer are maximized if both tier 1 suppliers single-source. Recall that
Given that (y) ⇤ (y) p y is concave, the first-order condition for concavity implies that
On the other hand, by assumption (b), there existsx such that
Note that such ax exists as long as h is strictly increasing. Thus,
where we use the fact that zz 0 > 0 whenever max{z, z 0 } 2 [x,x] and that 0 > 0. Consequently,
where the second inequality is a consequence of inequality (A.1) and concavity of . On the other hand, by the mean value theorem, there exists x
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The proof is complete once we show that there exists a concave function such that the first term is larger than the second. This, however, is immediate once one notes that the domains over which the two integrals are taken are nonoverlapping and f is a continuous distribution. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5
Throughout the proof, we focus on a supplier that obtains a fraction > 1/2 of its inputs from fabricator 1. The case of 6 1/2 can be handled symmetrically. Before presenting the proof of the proposition, we state and prove two lemmas.
Lemma 1. For 6 1 , let S 3 , where
On the other hand, given that > 1/2, it is immediate that if z 2 > z 1 and z 2 + (1 )z 1 6 , then z 1 + (1 )z 2 6 . Thus,
Finally, since z 1 6 z 2 over S 3 , it is immediate that the integral on the right-hand side above is nonpositive, completing the proof.
Proof. We prove the lemma by showing that the derivative of G( ) with respect to is nonpositive as long as > 1/2. By the Leibniz integral rule, we directly obtain
Proof of Proposition 5. Consider a tier 1 supplier that orders n units in total from the fabricators and sources a fraction > 1/2 of its order from fabricator 1. We prove the theorem by showing that the derivative of the supplier's profit function ⇧(n, ) is decreasing for > 1/2, which implies that dual-sourcing maximizes its profits. Recall that the latter are given by (5). Thus,
where H( · ) denotes the Heaviside step function, and z ⇤ z 1 + (1 )z 2 is the total number of units obtained by the supplier. Differentiating ⇧(n, ) with respect to its sourcing decision implies that
The proof is complete once we show that the integral on the right-hand size is negative for > 1/2. To this end, we consider five different cases depending on the value of relative to x m /n and x a /n. For notational simplicity, we denote the set {(z 1 , z 2 ): x m /n 6 z 6 x a /n} with . (i) First, suppose that x m , x a 6 (1 )n. It is immediate to verify that
where Q( ) is defined in (A.3). Given that x a > x m , Lemma 2 implies that the above is nonpositive.
(ii) Suppose that x m 6 n(1 ) 6 n 6 x a . In this case, we have π
On the other hand, a simple change of variables implies that
and therefore, Ä (z 1 z 2 ) dz 1 dz 2 ⇤ Ä Q(1 x a /n) (z 1 z 2 ) dz 1 dz 2 Ä Q(x m /n) (z 1 z 2 ) dz 1 dz 2 . Furthermore, it must be the case that 1 x a /n > x m /n. Consequently, once again by Lemma 2, it is immediate that the right-hand side of the above expression is nonpositive.
(iii) Next suppose that n 6 x a and n(1 ) 6 x m . This case, however, cannot arise as x a + x m > n contradicts the assumption that x m /n + x a /n < 1.
(iv) Next, suppose that n(1 ) 6 x m , x a 6 n . In this case,
we have
where the last inequality follows from m x a > x m , which implies that x m + x a < n.
(v) Finally, suppose that x m 6 (1 )n 6 x a 6 n. In this case, π
From case (iv), we know that the second integral in (A.6) is nonpositive. Furthermore, case (i) implies that the first term in (A.6) is also negative. To summarize, the derivative of the expected profit of each supplier with respect to expressed in (A.5) is negative for > 1/2, implying that it is optimal for the suppliers to dualsource. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6
Throughout the proof, for simplicity, we let z A ⇤ n( A z 1 + (1 A )z 2 ) and z B ⇤ n( B z 1 + (1 B )z 2 ) denote the input parts delivered to suppliers A and B, respectively. We first state a simple lemma, the proof of which is a straightforward consequence of Leibnitz's integral rule and is thus omitted.
Lemma 3. Suppose that g(z 1 , z 2 ) is bounded in both arguments with a support restricted to [0, 1] 2 . Then, for any > 0,
Proof of Proposition 6. The first part of the proposition follows from extending Proposition 1. Specifically, note that when v a ⇤ 0, the suppliers' production function is concave, which in turn implies that 2h(z) > h(z A ) + h(z B ), wherez ⇤ n(z 1 + z 2 )/2. Thus,
where (n, A , B ) is the expected profit of the manufacturer given in (6), and recall that the manufacturer's optimal total order size to tier 1 is normalized to 2 in the absence of disruptions (the manufacturer, however, may overorder-i.e., set 2n > 2). This implies that term (A.8) is positive since function is increasing forz < 1. The claim follows by noting that when h(z) > 1, it has to be the case that z A , z B > x a , which in turn implies that 2h(z) ⇤ h(z A ) + h(z B ), and thus, term (A.9) is equal to zero. To see this, assume for the sake of contradiction that z A 6 x A . Then,
where the first inequality follows from z A 6 x A and z B 6 n, the second inequality follows from the assumption that n 6 2 x a , and the last equality follows from the fact that we normalized the manufacturer's optimal order size in the absence of disruptions to 1. To prove the second part, we show that the manufacturer's profit can increase if one of the suppliers does not fully dualsource. In particular, we show that
To simplify notation, let I( · ) denote the indicator function and define am ⇤ (µ a µ m )x a . Then,
recalling thatz ⇤ n(z 1 + z 2 )/2. The derivative of ( · ) with respect to A satisfies
Next, we show that the limit of the first three terms (A.10)-(A.12) as A # 1/2 is equal to zero. Note that the integrands in all three terms are continuous and bounded functions of A . Hence, by the dominated convergence theorem, the limit as A # 1/2 is simply equal to evaluating each term at A ⇤ 1/2. This immediately implies that the first three terms are indeed all equal to zero at A ⇤ 1/2. This is a consequence of the fact that the integrands in (A.10)-(A.12) are antisymmetric in z 1 and z 2 , and hence, integrating each over the unit square leads to a value of zero. As for the remaining terms, we employ Lemma 3 and obtain the following: Operations Research, 2018 , vol. 66, no. 4, pp. 1023 -1039 , © 2018 Finally, the fact that ( · ) is strictly concave implies that the above integral is strictly negative. Thus, the expected profits of the monopolist would be strictly higher if supplier A deviates from complete dual-sourcing. Q.E.D.
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For a recent example, see Carvalho et al. (2016) .
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Other examples include Anupindi and Akella (1993) , Federgruen and Yang (2008) , Yang et al. (2009 Yang et al. ( , 2012 , and Hu and Kostamis (2015) . For a comprehensive survey of this literature, see Tomlin and Wang (2011) and Aydın et al. (2011) .
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For the case of single-sourcing, we constrain the suppliers to source from distinct fabricators (i.e., A 2 {0, 1} and B ⇤ 1 A ). This ensures that the systematic losses we study do not result from the concentration of suppliers' orders at a single fabricator. Furthermore, note that as long as is concave, the outcome in which the two suppliers single-source from the same fabricator is Pareto dominated by the case in which they single-source from distinct fabricators.
4
It may be worthwhile to note that, qualitatively, the insight we illustrate in Proposition 2 would remain the same if tier 1 suppliers had different production functions: nonconvexities in the chain (e.g., in the production function of one of the tier 1 suppliers) tend to create misalignments in the supply network configurations that firms operating in different tiers view as optimal.
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Recall that if h has no inflection points, then Proposition 1 guarantees that all parties' incentives are fully aligned. Furthermore, note that if x ⇤ , 1/2, symmetry around the inflection point means that h is symmetric over the interval [max{0, 2x ⇤ 1}, min{2x ⇤ , 1}].
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For a more thorough treatment of the role of bankruptcies in supply chains, see Swinney and Netessine (2009) and Yang et al. (2015) .
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Equivalently, R can be interpreted as the firm's bankruptcy cost in the case of a default, a cost that is avoided if the firm is capable of paying the fixed cost v.
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The above example highlights that the types of nonconvexities that we studied in the previous section may not necessarily arise as a consequence of returns to scale in production. Rather, they can also arise in response to financial or operational constraints. In particular, for our results to hold, h does not have to be interpreted as a physical production function per se. In the context of the bankruptcy example above, even though the suppliers' production technology enables them to turn each unit of input to a unit of the intermediate good, the presence of the fixed cost v ensures that the number of units eventually delivered to the manufacturer follows Equation (3).
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For example, the following cross-contingent contract guarantees that the firms' endogenous sourcing decisions will result in a chain that is optimal for the downstream manufacturer for the setting we study in Subsection 4.2. The price for supplier A is given as a function of the quantities that the manufacturer receives from suppliers A, B, which we denote by y A and y B , by where is some constant.
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This argument also shows that even though, for the sake of simplicity, we restricted our attention to fixed-price contracts between the manufacturer and its suppliers, our results are not driven by this assumption. Rather, similar moral hazard problems would arise as long as the suppliers' sourcing decisions are not contractable and they are restricted to writing (linear or nonlinear) bilateral contracts with their suppliers.
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In a very different context, Shin and Tunca (2010) show that bilateral pricing schemes lead to overinvestment in demand forecasting when firms compete in quantities. Also, they show that a cross-contingent contracting scheme can achieve coordination in the demand forecasting process.
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